We are thus led to the distinction between the psychic (Seelisches), which is subjective in a preeminent sense, and the mental (Geistiges), which is objective with regard to the psychic. Distinction is no way purports separation or severance. One of Husserl’s most significant contributions, consequential also for the reform of psychology, consists precisely in establishing the distinction between the psychic and the mental and, at the same time, setting forth the essential connection between them.
The philosophical foundation of the human sciences, especially the historical sciences, must take its departure from the theory of cultural objects. Husserl’s phenomenological psychology thus provides the theoretical means for realizing Dilthey’s intentions. (Gurwitsch, 1974/1966, p. 94).
Referência: GURWITSCH, Aron. Edmund Husserl’s Conception of Phenomenological Psychology. In: GURWITSCH, Aron; EMBREE, Lester (Ed.). Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, pp. 77-105. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. <Originalmente publicado, com o mesmo título, em Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XIX (1966), um estudo crítico sobre as conferências de Husserl dedicadas à psicologia fenomenológica: Phänomenologische Psychologie, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana IX (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962)>.
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