O sentido dos objetos culturais, segundo A. Gurwitsch

Ao investigar a mundanidade do psíquico, Gurwitsch conclui que o mental ou psíquico, de modo diferente de outras entidades mundanas, não está essencialmente alocado no espaço: seu traço essencial é a temporalidade. Para que os atos mentais se concretizem no mundo, é necessário um apoio corpóreo, isto é, que esteja disposto no espaço e no tempo. É assim que Gurwitsch encontra os objetos culturais.

ANY CULTURAL OBJECT indicates the presence of the mental within the world, i.e., as attached to a corporeal thing. Houses, fields, gardens, pieces of furniture, tools and instruments of every kind, paintings, sculptures, other products of artistic creation, and the like are cultural objects. Literary documents of religious, philosophical, scientific, etc., content also belong here. Such objects are, on one hand, inanimate corporeal things, existing in space and time and possessing all the properties characteristic of things made of one or another kind of material. On the other hand, these objects are meant to serve specific purposes; they are to be handled in well-defined ways so as to yield results desired in certain situations. In the case of literary documents, a meaning is conveyed by the corporeal thing. Quite in general, corporeal things become cultural objects owing to the meaning or sense (Sinn) bestowed upon them. The cultural sense is not merely superadded to, or superimposed upon, the corporeal thing. Husserl speaks of the sense as impressed (eingedrückt). That is, the corporeal thing is permeated, {p. 93:} imbued, and impregnated with sense. Consequently, an abstractive process is required for distinguishing the two strata, the corporeal thing as carrier of sense and the sense itself as carried by it. (Gurwitsch, 1974/1966, pp. 92-3).

Esses objetos estão localizados em uma sociedade:

By its very sense, every cultural object refers to a particular society, the circumstances and conditions under which that society lives, and a system of purposes recognized by it. (idem, p. 93).

O sentido desses objetos possui uma objetividade que pode ser compreendida por qualquer pessoa que possua competência em compreender a sociedade à qual eles pertencem:

[...] the sense, once it has been impressed on a corporeal thing, acquires an independence and objectivity of its own. Fixed in a corporeal thing, the sense becomes a character properly belonging to the cultural object thus constituted. The latter is generally accessible. It can be grasped and understood in a variety of modes by everyone; at first by everyone who belongs to a certain society. The objectivity in question here is intersubjective objectivity in a special sense, namely, objectivity with respect to and for the given society. (idem, p. 93).

Apesar de sua objetividade e apesar de estar, a princípio, fundido com a coisa corpórea, o sentido a transcende:

Both the meaning of a mathematical theorem (or, generally, any proposition whatever) and the sense of a cultural object denote an “irreal” or ideal entity related to a real corporeal thing. Because of that attachment, the ideal entity may have effects in the real world by motivating and stimulating cultural activities of several kinds, as when instruments are improved, scientific discoveries further developed, and the like. (idem, p. 94).

Referência: GURWITSCH, Aron. Edmund Husserl’s Conception of Phenomenological Psychology. In: GURWITSCH, Aron; EMBREE, Lester (Ed.). Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, pp. 77-105. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. <Originalmente publicado, com o mesmo título, em Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XIX (1966), um estudo crítico sobre as conferências de Husserl dedicadas à psicologia fenomenológica: Phänomenologische Psychologie, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana IX (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962)>.